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Introduction 
Carbon pricing intersects energy policies 
• Carbon pricing aims to influence : 
• directly the choices of fossil fuel users, and  
• indirectly the use of intermediary and final goods produced with fossil fuel inputs  
     substitution with cleaner fuel, efficient process, electricity savings, etc. 
• Important energy policies exist, which, in developing countries, are not 
related at all to emission reductions: 
• Low energy prices for economic and social development  
• Social equity (rural electrification, geographic price equalization, social tariff, etc) 
• Long term security of supply (among which consumers’protection against price variability of 
imported fuel) 
• Promotion of national energy resources (fossil fuel, renewables) for the sake of dependence 
limitation, industrial development,  macroeconomic equilibria… 
• Inflation control, etc., etc. 
• Carbon pricing interferes with these objectives, sometimes converges 
with, sometimes conflicts with … 
 
 
Introduction 
• Power sector which is the largest emitter of CO2 (30% around in average) is 
a major field of  energy policies  
• It is typically the case of a sector subject to many regulations that reflect 
important energy policy objectives not related at all to emission reductions 
 
• So importance to anticipate effects of the introduction of a carbon pricing 
mechanism(ETS, carbon tax  ) 
• Its effectiveness in matter of carbon emission reductions 
• Its effects on electricity prices with their eventual interference with other 
energy policies 
 
 
1. Carbon pricing effects in the power sector 
Carbon pricing can influence emissions from the power sector in three ways, via its 
effects on electricity generation costs and market prices 
• 1.by turning the electricity generated by existing carbon intensive power plants 
more expensive and thus less competitive against cleaner technologies :  
• this is the short term substitution effect (mainly dispatching effects) 
• 2. by turning the investment in new carbon intensive power plants less attractive 
compare to clean energy investment:  
• this is the long term structural effect 
• 3. by turning the electricity price more expensive for the final customer, and thus 
inducing a reduction in consumption and so in emitting generation, 
 
But this raises redistribution issues  (theoretical dilemna “efficiency” versus “equity”) 
related to energy policy objectives:  
•  economic development/industrial competitiveness  
• (Effects on energy intensive industries, so issue exemption/compensation) 
•   social welfare and  affordability 
 
The effects of carbon pricing  are very dependent on the organisation and regulation of the power 
sector which differ widely 
•  differences of market competition at different levels 
•  difference of wholesale « spot market »  
• difference of tariff regulation at the retail level 
 
Indeed carbon pricing effects on electricity pricing depend on: 
• the price setting :  
how the carbon price/cost  is passed through in wholesale price and then in retail prices ? 
•  the wholesale and retrail price  regulation  :  
• how regulators organise the cost recovery of the retailers?  
• Possible exemptions for large consumers (issu of competitiveness) 
• What to do with windfall profit in case of free allowances 
 
Here again carbon pricing  intersects energy policies objectives.  
Indeed the adoption of a type of  model answered to energy policy goals to place in each context 
Competitiveness : to avoid economic inefficiency of regulated monopolies, public ownership, etc 
Long term security of supply  : to attract investors 
Economic and social development: the control of long term cost and electricity prices  
 
 
 
 
 
 2. The choice between different models of regulation and organisation of 
power sector 
 
 
 Very different degrees of de-verticalisation, multi-level competition and privatisation           
but  also « reform of the reforms »  
  
 
California, Brazil, 
Chili, columbia, 
Peru 
Presently UK 
   1.1. Energy policy goals of reforms   in the OECD countries 
• Drawbacks of the  model of vertical public service monopolies : overcapacity, 
overemployment, productivity issues 
• Reform objectives:  
• Short term and long term efficiency by the pressures of competition 
•  innovation dynamics 
• Benefits for the consumers (lower prices than in the former model) 
 
Main characters 
• Deverticalization and unbundling 
• Free access to grids 
• Free choice of suppliers and vice versa 
• Bilateral transactions + power exchange 
 
 
 
   1.2. Policy goals of reforms in emerging and developing countries 
Goal: Economic developement and security of supply  
Because public debt crisis, and financing constraints on national utilities:  
• Degradation of the operating performance and the security of supply 
• Impossibility to follow the demand growth 
Privatisation and law change in order to attract private investors, and independent 
power producers (IPPs) and foreign utilities 
• Putting at distance discretionary regulation by ministry regulation 
• Change in the tariff regulation (to cover costs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Answer by Single Buyer Model (model 2) 
Many countries keep vertical integration combined with IPPs,  India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, South 
Africa &Vietnam   
Features in common:  
■ Procurement of new generation by call for tenders is run by the vertically integrated utility  
■Electricity supply is governed by long term Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) with the utility  
 Typical structure of Power Purchase Agreements 
■Long term contracts for the life of the asset (25 to >40 years) with a typical allocation of risk:  
■PPAs have a typical payment structure that is based on two types of payments: 
       Capacity charges and Energy charges which cover variable costs of the plant including fuel costs 
and all variable O&M. 
 
Effective development of new capacities:  
The combination of  risk allocation and payment structure means that IPP projects are relatively low 
risk, which allows them to be project financed  
 
 
 3. The re-reform in emerging countries: from Model 4 to  Model 3  
 
    The goal : long term security of supply 
• Crisis of the new markets  (Brazil, California) 
• Crisis related to the lack of investment because of market failures (risk management) 
• Long term contracts to attract new investment   (to guarantee revenue for fixed cost recovery) 
• To get out the price setting aligned on short term marginal cost for a long term coordination 
based on expectation of complete costs by generators and investors 
• Auctioning of long-term contracts as a way to conciliate the risk reduction for new investors 
with efficiency in energy procurement for regulated users.  
 
 
 Answer by Hybrid Model 3: planning + long term competition for contracts  
     
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The core of the new scheme lies on three main rules:  
■All retailers and free consumers (>2-3MW), should be 100% contracted at any time  
■All contracts should be covered by “firm energy” or “firm capacity” certificates. 
Some contracts could last on 15 years  and more  
 ■Auction : Regulated users must acquire their energy supply contracts through auction.  (Not free 
consumers but they should prove they have covered their sourcing by contracts) 
Small role for the spot market : in fact a centralized cost-based dispatch and not a price dispatch + 
Importance of remaining retail monopoly to regional distributors fro the long termcontracting 
 
 
 
Short term substitution effect 
by turning the electricity generated 
by existing carbon intensive power 
plants more expensive and thus less 
competitive against cleaner 
technologies  
Short term substitution: 
 the impact of carbon pricing on the economic dispatching either by the spot market or 
by the dispatcher coordination  
  
Long term effects 
Turning the investment in new carbon 
intensive power plants less attractive 
compare to clean energy investment: 
this is the long term substitution 
effect 
  
Long term effect:  
It is not only an issue of relative cost-prices between technologies (levelized costs) 
It is is also  an issue of fixed cost recovery by revenue on the market 
So anticipated revenue of generators depend on carbon price effects on the wholesale 
price or on price indexation in long term contract price 
  
Effects on electricity consumers 
by turning the electricity price more 
expensive for the final customer, and 
thus inducing a reduction in 
consumption and thus in generation 
  
There is a redistribution issue of carbon pricing by ETS or carbon tax 
• Retail prices increase (issue of the indirect costs on energy intensive industries) 
• Specific redistribution effects in case of free allowances with an ETS: windfall profits 
on emitting plants  
Effects of carbon pricing in these different structures 
Section 2.Effects of carbon pricing in the Model 4  
          Expected effects of carbon pricing in the Model 4 (I)  
• Electricity markets are strutured in (semi-) hourly markets 
Short term effects on selection of equipment by the hourly markets : Change in the merit order on 
the hourly markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Long term effects : investment in low carbon technologies rather 
than in emitting plants 
 
 
Long term effects : investment in low carbon technologies (II) 
          Distribution effects of carbon pricing in the Model 4  (I) 
  
• Increase of  wholesale prices in annual average, but it is not so simple 
• Carbon price passthrough in the hourly price depending on the technology mix  
• Duration of annual periods when fossil fuel plants are the marginal plants on the hourly 
markets 
• With a large share of hydro, and nuke, hourly prices would increase only when fossil plants is 
needed 
 
Increase of retail price: it is a legitimate signal addressed to consumers on their indirect 
responsibilities in  carbon emissions,  
• but redistributive effect raises the issue of acceptance (lobbying of energy intensives 
industries) 
Distribution effects of carbon pricing  
In case of free allowances, a hot issue:  undue rent on existing emitting plants (I) 
• Price bids on the market aligned not only the variable costs, but also include  
the market value of allowances 
• As if generator compare between production and use of the allownaces and sales of 
allowances on thehe ETS market,   
• opportunity cost is passed through in the price bids of every « fossil »competitor, and 
then in the hourly price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution effects of carbon pricing  
In case of free allowances, a hot issue:  undue rent on existing emitting plants (II) 
 
 
 
 
 
So very large redistributive effects in favor of electricity companies even with 
emitting plants 
 
• To note: Difference of cost pass-through between power sector and other 
sectors (cement , chemical, steel…) exposed to international competition with 
competitors w/o carbon constraints 
 
• The answer in  the EU: to skip to full auctioning in power sector in the 3rd EU-
ETS phase (2013-2020) 
 
 Section 3.  Carbon pricing in Hybrid Model  
(Planning + long term competition for contracts) 
Model 3. Hybrid model : planning + long term competition for contracts  
 
 In the past decade, new reform wave in Latin America that relies on auctioning of 
long term contracts to attract new investment  
■ Centralized cost-based dispatch (called “spot market”);  
Remaining distributors monopoly (retail prices for consumers are regulated ) 
except for very large consumers 
■Addition of an auctioning of long-term contracts as a way to conciliate the risk 
reduction for new investors with efficiency in energy procurement for regulated 
users.  
The core of the new scheme lies on three main rules:  
■All retailers and free consumers (>2-3MW), should be 100% contracted at any 
time  
■All contracts should be covered by “firm energy” or “firm capacity” certificates. 
Some contracts could last on 15 years  and more in Brazil 
 ■Auction : Regulated users must acquire their energy supply contracts through 
auction.  (Not free consumers but they should prove they have covered their sourcing 
by cotnrats) 
 
 
  
Differences in implementation in Brazil and Chili  
 ■Brazil (2004) :  
Centralized scheme with auction organized by government  to select 
contracts for covering  distribution company’s needs  
Standardized contracts: prices on energy and capacity   
■Chile (2005):  
Decentralized scheme : distribution companies manage their auctions 
Non standardized contracts 
Only energy contracts; addition of a regulated capacity price 
______________________________________________________ 
To note: In the two organisations, minor role of the “spot market” 
•  Brazil: computational model to define each week three blocks price 
• Chili: economic dispatching on the basis of the variable costs of the 
different plants 
 
 
• Short term effectiveness : guarantee by the economic dispatching 
• Long term issues : effectiveness of long term contracts to invest in low 
carbon technologies  
      but importance of the structure of the contracts (inclusion of 
carbon prices in the indexation  formula)  
  importance of the criteria of the auctioning (not only 
electricity price but the indexation formula) 
• Distributive issue :  
• The issue of carbon cost-passthrough if free allowances 
• The issue of rent on existing hydro plants: solution of taxation 
Conditions of effectiveness of an ETS price 
• Short term effect: No need of change in the economic dispatching process 
• In Brazil computation of short term price should include carbon price in the variable cost of 
the fossil fuel plants 
• In Chile economic dispatching shall normally include information of carbon price in the 
variable 
• An issue: if 90% free allowance, should we introduce rent for fossil fuel plants ? 
 
• Long term and structural effects 
• ETS price is supposed to incite to invest in low carbon technologies ;  
• at least if fossil technologies are needed, to invest in the least emmitting ones 
• Long term contracts allow revenue aligned on complete costs and so recovery of fixed costs 
 
But the structure of the contracts should be flexible to allow permanent alignement of prices 
on complete costs: ie pass through of carbon price variations in the price 
 
 
Condition of long term effectiveness of carbon pricing in the case of Chile 
• Generators and investors bid a specific price (£/MWh) and energy amount for each contract (with  
monthly peak and off-peak supply) to a distributor’s auctioning. 
• Indexing formulas  are used in the contracts with the intention of hedging mid- and long-terms risks.  
• Problem:   
• Assumptions on price projections are important for the auctioneer’ bid price.  
• But  auctioneers cannot propose the indexation formula when allocating, avoiding any type of 
risk assessment.  
 
This point is important  for two reasons :  
• if carbon pricing is introduced, it should be necessary to readjust the indexation formula in existing 
contracts ;  
• Given the volatility of an ETS price, it adds to the risk on fossil fuel prices when the auctioneers  
have to anticipate the change in their variable costs.  
• If  no re-adjustment of existing long term contracts, the risk is that a generator will close its 
equipment if it could not cover its variable costs when carbon price increases 
 
• So it will be necessary to auction not only on price per MWh, but also the indexation formula in a 
way or another 
 
 
 
 
Distribution effects of carbon pricing in the hybrid model  
 
 
• Retail price regulations guarantee wholesale price change in the regulated 
tarifs 
 
• Increase of the wholesale price in relation to the technology mix (number 
of hours when a fossil plant is marginal in the dispatch) 
• In systems with hydro (75% Brazil; 40% Chili), carbon pricing creates rent on hydro 
producers during hours when fossil plants are marginal (with and w/o free 
allowances) 
• It could be a problem if fossil plants are marginal during almost all the year (rent + 
competition issue) 
Answer: tax on hydro rent 
 
• Issue of rent if free allowances for the emitting plants 
 
 
 
Section 4. Model 2 Single buyer 
The need of  a consistent electricity market design if carbon pricing 
Single Buyer Model 
Many countries keep vertical integration combined with IPPs, e.g. India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
South Africa &Vietnam   
Features in common:  
■ Planning is run by a central agency—usually the utility—who forecasts  demand  
■ Procurement of new generation is run by the vertically integrated utility  
■Electricity supply is governed by long term Power Purchase Agreements (PPA)  
 
 Typical structure of Power Purchase Agreements  
 
■Long term contracts for the life of the asset (25 to >40 years) with a typical allocation of risk:  
■PPAs have a typical payment structure that is based on two types of payments: 
   – Capacity charges: cover the fixed costs of the plant, including all capital costs and fixed O&M costs.  
    – Energy charges: cover the variable costs of the plant including fuel costs and all variable O&M costs. 
      Inflation risk: borne by the buyer through escalation provisions in the PPA     
 
Dispatch of the independent plants is common with the dispatch of the utility single buyer:  merit order of 
variable costs 
 
 
Effects of carbon pricing 
• Short term effectiveness :  IPPs in economic dispatch by the single 
buyer 
 
• Long term effectiveness:  
Need of flexible PPAs with full indexation of ETS price 
 
• Redistributive effects :  
• The issue of carbon cost passthrough if free allowances 
 
Strong limitation on carbon pricing effectiveness  
when uncomplete market-based reform 
The Chinese case :  
The goal: easing financing and entries face to important shortages 
Adoption of a more decentralised model 
• many generators, separation of grids and distributors 
• Regional single buyers (regional grids) with very administered PPAs  
• initially fixed price/ no indexation formula, 
•  fixed annual production planning 
• Regulation with no cost pass through when change of fuel costs   
• When coal price was liberalized and increased , threat of numerous closures and risk of 
outages 
• Now just a yearly adjustment with long time-lag 
• Special regime for small coal plants with bad efficiency 
 
If an ETS is introduced  (90% free allowances + 10% auctioned) 
 
• Short term effects 
No economic dispatching, so no advantage for the most efficient coal plants (supercritical coal 
plants) to produce more, nor for the CCGTs 
 
Problem of introduction of variable ETS price: necessity to a flexible and reactive indexed price 
formula (coal price, carbon price)  
 
• Long term effects 
 
No playing field between generation technologies because of the fixed price setting and the 
annual production planning  
  limit revenues prospects +regulatory risks 
 
If free allowances and no cost passthrough, reduction of incentives to invest in low carbon 
technologies (Nuke, CCS, hydro, large RES-E) or more efficient coal plants 
 
• Short term and long term effects of exemption of small and medium size coal plants (70 
GW to  200 GW concerned),  
 
 
• Problem related to the absence of an economic dispatching (via a 
power exchange or a dispatch market center) 
• Problem related to the rigidity of price adaptation (fuel price, carbon 
price) in the pseudo-PPAs 
• Problem with exemptions of inefficient plants 
 
 
• Redistributive effects : Discretionay nature of regulation for the cost 
pass-through 
 5. Some remarks to conclude 
Importance to anticipate effects of carbon pricing, not only the expected ones, in particular when 
energy policies is intersected. 
Carbon pricing have different effects on carbon reduction and on electricity pricing , depending on the 
organisational model of power sector 
Complexity of any of these models, so importance to understand the functioning of the power sector 
regulation in a country to anticipate effects of carbon pricing 
 
Common conclusions 
• Short term reduction effect: need  of an  economic dispatching either by the spot market or by 
the dispatcher coordination  
• Long term effects : 
•  Need to have an effective long term foreseeability  of carbon price  
• Need of stability of long term revenues for investors in low carbon technology 
• Redistribution effects: mind some redistributive issue (free allowances , hydro rents) 
Some remarks to conclude 
Limited lessons from mutual experiences 
 • Situations between OEcD countres with a mature markets and emerging countries with important 
need of investement are too different 
 
• Lessons from OECD countries to emerging economies:  
• Mind the redistributive issue (free allowances, hydro rents) 
• Not sure that carbon pricing could be the sole solution, and have a real effectiveness for low 
carbon investment 
• Lessons from emerging economies to EU and OECD countries to decarbonize their electricity systems 
(with auctioning and long term contracts) 
• The Hybrid Model appears to be the most adapted to countries’ situation with a need of new 
capacities if they have a real commitment in carbon policy.  
• Carbon pricing should orient towards low carbon technologies with long term contracts 
• Attention should be focused on the structure of the long term contracts (indexation formula, 
because risks associated with ETS) 
 
• Single buyer : for having a ETS which makes sense in the power sector, need to have a consistent 
market-based model 
 
 Appendix 1  
Carbon pricing in Hybrid Model  
(Planning + long term competition for contracts) 
       Hybrid model : planning + long term competition for contracts  
   (To get out the price setting aligned on short term marginal cost, and to  
 In the past decade, new reform wave in Latin America that relies on auctioning of 
long term contracts to attract new investment  
■ Centralized cost-based dispatch (called “spot market”);  
Remaining distributors monopoly (retail prices for consumers are regulated ) 
except for very large consumers 
■Addition of an auctioning of long-term contracts as a way to conciliate the risk 
reduction for new investors with efficiency in energy procurement for regulated 
users.  
The core of the new scheme lies on three main rules:  
■All retailers and free consumers (>2-3MW), should be 100% contracted at any 
time  
■All contracts should be covered by “firm energy” or “firm capacity” certificates. 
Some contracts could last on 15 years  and more in Brazil 
 ■Auction : Regulated users must acquire their energy supply contracts through 
auction.  (Not free consumers but they should prove they have covered their sourcing 
by cotnrats) 
 
 
  
Differences in implementation in Brazil and Chili  
 ■Brazil (2004) : centralized scheme with auction organized by government   to 
contract distribution company’s needs  
contracts: price on energy and capacity; standardized contract, difference 
between existing and new equipment 
Possible specific auctions for large projects or RES-E 
 
■Chile 2005: decentralized scheme : distribution companies manage their 
auctions 
only energy contracts, non standardized; addition of a regulated capacity price 
______________________________________________________ 
To note: In the two organisations, minor role of the “spot market” 
•  Brazil: computational model to define each week three blocks price 
• Chili: economic dispatching on the basis of the variable costs of the different 
plants 
 
 
Conditions of effectiveness of an ETS price 
• Short term effect: No need of change in the economic dispatching process 
• In Brazil computation of short term price should include carbon price in the variable cost of 
the fossil plants 
• In Chili economic dispatching shall normally include information of carbon price in the 
variable 
• An issue: if 90% free allowance, should we introduce rent for fossile plants  
 
• Long term and structural effects 
• ETS price is supposed to incite to invest in low carbon technologies and at least if fossil 
technologies is needed, in the most efficient ones 
• Long term contracts allow revenue aligned on complete costs (or LRMC) and recovery of fixed 
costs 
• So the structure of the contracts should be flexible to allow permanent alignement of prices 
on complete costs: ie pass through of carbon price variations in the price 
 
 
Long term contracts auctions and selection criteria are not so favourable 
if carbon pricing with ETS : the case of Brazil 
• Generators bid not only on the option premium ($/MW) but also on the option strike price ($/MWh).  
• Bids are compared on the basis of the expected benefit for consumers:  
• the government, by means of a simulation procedure, calculates(i) the expected value of their fuel cost 
reimbursements  (in $/year), and (ii) the expected value of the short-term transactions at the spot 
market (in $/year).  
• the government estimates the plant usage and provides expected operation cost and spot  market 
transactions incurred  by the consumer. 
• Then a single unit energy cost–benefit index in $/MWh of firm energy is then calculated for each 
technology. 
• After selection, all contracts have full indexation to fuel prices and inflation.    
 
• So for the long term effect of carbon pricing ,  
• importance of the way the carbon price expectation (including its volality) is taken into account in the 
calculation of the expected value of their fuel costs reimbursements  in the selection process by the 
auctioning on one hand, 
• Importance of a  full indexation to the ETS price beside fuel price and inflation 
 
 
 
 
 
Long term carbon pricing effects: The case of Chili 
• Generators and investors bid a specific price (£/MWh) and energy amount for each contract (with  monthly 
peak and off-peak supply) to a distributor’s auctioning. 
• Indexing formulas  are used in the contracts with the intention of hedging mi- and long-terms risks.  
• Problem:   
• Asumptions on price projections are important for the auctioneer’ bid price.  
• But  auctioneers cannot propose the indexation formula when allocating, avoiding any type of risk 
assessment.  
• This point is important  for two reasons :  
• if carbon pricing is introduced, it should be necessary to readjust the indexation formula in existing 
contracts ;  
• given the volatility of an ETS price, it shall add to the risk on fossil fuel prices when the auctioneers will 
have to anticipate the change in their variable costs.  
• If  no re-adjustment of existing long term contracts, the risk is that a generator will close its equipment 
if it could not cover its variable cost  
(when the carbon pricing is implemented and when it increases significantly during a long period) 
 
• So it will be necessary to auction not only on price per MWh, but also the indexation formula in a way or 
another 
 
 
 
 
Distributional effects of carbon pricing in the hybrid model  
 
 
• Retail price regulation guarantees wholesale price change in the regulated 
tarifs) 
 
• Increase of the wholesale price in relation to the technology mix (number of 
hours when a fossil plant is marginal in the dispatch) 
• In systems with hydro (75% Brazil; 40% Chili), carbon pricing creates rent on hydro 
producers during hours when fossil plants are marginal (with and w/o free 
allowances) 
• It could be a problem if fossil plants are marginal during almost all the year (rent + 
competition issue) 
 
• Issue of rent if free allowances for the emitting plants 
 
• Note about competitiveness issue 
• Acceptance of electricity price increase by energy intensive industries could be solved by 
the rules of contracting of free conumers (>2-3MW) 
• Direct effects of carbon price on their contractual price with producers 
 
 
To sum up 
• Short term effectiveness : Importance of the power 
exchange/economic dispatching 
• Long term issues : effectiveness of long term contracts but 
importance of the structure of the contracts (inclusion of carbon 
prices in the indexation  formula) and the criteria of the auctioning 
• Distributive issue :  
• The issue of carbon cost-passthrough if free allowances 
• The issue of rent on exisiting hydro plants 
Appendix 2.  
Carbon pricing  in  Single buyer model 
 
Single Buyer Model 
Many countries keep vertical integration combined with IPPs, e.g. India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
South Africa &Vietnam   
Features in common:  
■ Planning is run by a central agency—usually the utility—who forecasts  demand  
■ Procurement of new generation is run by the vertically integrated utility  
■Electricity supply is governed by long term Power Purchase Agreements (PPA)  
 
 Typical structure of Power Purchase Agreements  
 
■Long term contracts for the life of the asset (25 to >40 years) with a typical allocation of risk:  
■PPAs have a typical payment structure that is based on two types of payments: 
   – Capacity charges: cover the fixed costs of the plant, including all capital costs and fixed O&M costs.  
    – Energy charges: cover the variable costs of the plant including fuel costs and all variable O&M costs. 
      Inflation risk: borne by the buyer through escalation provisions in the PPA     
 
Dispatch of the independent plants is common with the dispatch of the utility single buyer: common  merit 
order of variable costs 
 
 
• Short term effectiveness :  IPPs in economic dispatch by the single 
buyer 
 
• Long term effectiveness: Need of flexible PPAs with full indexation of 
ETS price 
                                 
• Redistributive effects : The issue of carbon cost passthrough if free 
allowances 
Strong limitation on carbon pricing effectiveness  
when inconsistent market –based reform  
 China:  inconsistent market design of power sector reform 
• The goal: easing financing and entries face to important shortages) 
• Adoption of a scheme with many generators, separation of grids and 
distributors 
• Regional single buyers (regional grids) with regulated PPAs  
• with fixed price/ no indexation formula, and  
• with fixed annual production planning 
• Regulation with no pass through of fuel costs  change 
• When coal price was liberalized and increased , threat of numerous closures and risk of 
outages 
• Now just a yearly adjustment with long time-lag 
• Special regime for small coal plants with bad efficiency 
 
If an ETS price is introduced  (90% free allowances + 10% auctioned) 
 
• Short term effects 
No economic dispatching, so no advantage for the most efficient coal plants to produce 
more, nor for the CCGTs 
Problem of introduction of a variable carbon price: necessity to a flexible and reactive 
indexed price formula (coal price, carbon price)  
 
• Long term effects 
Exemption of small and medium size coal plants (68 GW/ 138GW), so no obsolesence 
effects 
No playing field between generation technologies because of the fixed price setting 
and the annual production planning which limit revenues prospects +regulatory risks 
If free allowances and no cost passthrough of them, reduction of incentives to invest in 
low carbon technologies (Nuke, CCS, hydro, large RES-E) or more efficient coal plants 
No signal effects to electricity intensive industries to improve their process 
 
 
If an ETS price is introduced….. 
Distributive effects 
Powerful regulation with important discretion 
Easy to exempt inefficient small coal plants, to manipulate individual allocations 
Easy to limit the cost passthrough to the 10% auctioned 
Blockades of possible 100% to be auctioned 
 
Interactions with other energy policies 
      Possible exuberance of RES-E subsidization policies: which effects on the ETS price?  
(which consideration in the definition of the evolving quota allocation to the power sector?) 
______________________________________________________________ 
ETS carbon pricing would only make sense in the  Chinese power sector if there is a 
clear jump the Hybrid Model 3 
But in the present regulatory environment, ETS pricing would have distortive effects. 
Carbon tax would be a better signal 
 
 
 
 
